Alternation in Africa: Fomunyoh compares Malawi and Benin to Biya's Cameroon :: CAMEROON

Info 360Apr 11, 2026Read original

43 years in power versus two peaceful transfers: the African contrast according to Fomunyoh

Forty-three years. This is the length of Paul Biya's reign in Cameroon, highlighted by Dr. Christopher Fomunyoh as the absolute counter-example of a

. His statement, published after the APO2026 forum in Brussels, compares three radically opposed African trajectories.

Dr. Christopher Fomunyoh is Senior Director for Africa at the National Democratic Institute (NDI), an American organization promoting democracy. His statement comes the day after the

forum, held in Brussels, where he met former Malawian President Lazarus Chakwera. The latter received a standing ovation in plenary for respecting his country's constitution after his defeat in the 2025 presidential election in

.

Fomunyoh also cites Mokgweetsi Masisi, former president of

, as a second example of a dignified and constitutional departure from power. He contrasts them with the Cameroonian case, where Paul Biya, 93, has been governing since 1982. Fomunyoh reports that millions of Cameroonians claim that Biya lost the presidential election in October 2025; an allegation contested by the regime in place.

The

has become one of the most scrutinized indicators by international institutions and election observers. For decades, the continent has been associated with coups, extended mandates, and revised constitutions to keep leaders in power. The cases of Malawi and Botswana break with this trend in a verifiable way.

In Malawi, Chakwera himself benefited in 2020 from a historic decision by the Constitutional Court that had annulled the election of his predecessor Peter Mutharika for fraud. His own defeat in 2025 and his withdrawal without violent protest are therefore seen as a rare institutional consistency. In Botswana, Masisi's defeat to Duma Boko in 2024 resulted in a handover of power praised by the African Union and international observers.

Electoral

is therefore not a theoretical ideal. It exists, it works, and it produces precedents.

Fomunyoh's statement is not an academic analysis. It is a deliberate political act. By placing Chakwera and Masisi on a pedestal at a high-level international forum, he creates an implicit standard against which any African leader can be compared. The

thus becomes the named counter-model, in a space where the formula has a real diplomatic resonance.

The allegation that Biya lost the

is made by the opposition and relayed by Fomunyoh. The Cameroonian regime disputes these accusations. To date, no independent international body has definitively ruled on the regularity of the election. What Fomunyoh's statement establishes with certainty is that the challenge to this result now has a structured international audience.

The mention of

in his statement adds an immediate topical dimension: Patrice Talon is preparing to leave power after two constitutional terms, in accordance with his country's fundamental law. This voluntary departure, in a West African context marked by several recent coups, is presented as an act of institutional maturity.

International pressure on the Cameroonian regime will intensify. African multilateral forums? African Union, Economic Community of Central African States will be spaces where the Cameroonian case will continue to be discussed, even indirectly. The

post-election is looking for an international platform that voices like Fomunyoh's are helping to build.

The Malawian and Botswanan examples could become jurisprudential references for African constitutional courts facing electoral challenges.

What Fomunyoh's statement implies is simple: African institutions can work. Presidents can lose and leave. Peoples can elect and be heard. The question he leaves open without formulating it is this: will Cameroonians one day also get their standing ovation?